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INTRODUCTION
In U.S. state courts, two general standards presently co-
exist for determination of admissibility of novel scientific expert
testimony: the Frye standard and the Daubert standard.'
Scholars have provided numerous analyses of the merits and
weaknesses of Frye versus Daubert2 with some advocating for
uniform adoption of Daubert,3 the standard of the federal
courts. 4 Much less attention has been focused on whether the
two standards consistently lead to different results in the
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993);
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Leo H. Whinery,
Expert Testimony Trends in State Practice and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
SF78 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 149, 176-83 (Apr. 26, 2001); Heather G. Hamilton, Note,
The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States Stand?, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 201, 208-09 (1998).
2. Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 703-04, 780-
82 (1998); Andrew B. Gagen, What Is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of
Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire on the Admissibility of Scientific Expert
Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 401, 420-23 (2001-2002); Lorie S.
Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony in Minnesota After the
Daubert Trilogy, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 105-09 (2000); Michael H.
Graham, The Daubert Dilemma: At Last a Viable Solution?, 179 F.R.D. 1
(1998); Brian Holmgren, The Expert Witness, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 593 (2002);
Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's
Hubris, 43 EMORY L.J. 913 (1994); Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific
Gatekeeepers After Daubert, Joiner, Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is
Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV. 87, 92-115 (2001); Alan
W. Tamarelli, Jr., Recent Development, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability-The
Questionable Wisdom of Abandoning the Peer Review Standard for Admitting
Expert Testimony, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1195-1203 (1994); Stuart J.
Graham, Comment, Abandoning New York's "General Acceptance"
Requirement: Redesigning Proposed Rule of Evidence 702(b) After Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 BUFF. L. REV. 229, 239-242, 240 n.49
(1995); Penelope Harley, Comment, Minnesota Decides: Goeb v. Tharalson and
the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 460, 506-08
(2001).
3. See, e.g., Gildea, supra note 2, at 106-08 (urging the Minnesota
Supreme Court to abandon Frye in favor of Daubert); S.J. Graham, supra note
2, at 261 (urging that New York move away from the general acceptance test
of Frye to the reliability test of Daubert); Harley, supra note 2, at 506-08
(arguing for adoption of Daubert in Minnesota). But see Montz, supra note 2,
at 114-15 (concluding that Frye remains the more reliable solution).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (D. Md.
2002) (acknowledging in the context of a challenge to the admissibility of field
sobriety test results that federal courts follow the Daubert standard).
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courtroom. The question asked in this Note is whether
adherence to one or the other standard is determinative in
decisions to admit or exclude three types of scientific evidence.
The types of evidence evaluated are DNA profiling with the
short-tandem-repeat polymerase-chain-reaction method (STR-
PCR DNA); horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), a field sobriety
test; and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS). For each of these three types of scientific evidence,
appellate decisions on admissibility are compared in states that
follow Frye and those that follow Daubert. States were almost
uniform in admitting STR-PCR DNA profiling evidence,
whether they applied the Frye or Daubert standard. In
contrast, there were striking differences in the state courts'
decisions regarding admissibility of both HGN as well as
CSAAS evidence. The differences, however, were not correlated
with adherence to either the Frye or Daubert standard of
admissibility.
Part I of this Note begins by comparing and contrasting the
criteria for admissibility elaborated in the Frye and Daubert
standards. Part II provides scientific background for the three
types of evidence considered and also delineates the criteria by
which states were chosen for analysis. Parts III, IV, and V
discuss, compare, and contrast opinions admitting or excluding
the three types of scientific evidence. Finally, Part VI suggests
general patterns and factors that appear to influence
admissibility of scientific evidence in Frye and Daubert states.
The primary conclusion of this Note is that factors outside of
those elaborated by the Frye and Daubert criteria have a larger
influence than the standards themselves have on decisions of
admissibility for at least some types of scientific evidence.
I. FRYE VERSUS DAUBERT: SIMILARITIES
AND DIFFERENCES
The Frye standard, which was devised eighty years ago in
a brief opinion by the Federal District Court of the District of
Columbia, dictates that the principle or test that is offered "be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance"
within the relevant scientific community. 5 In the original
application of the Frye approach, the result of a systolic blood
pressure deception test (a lie detector test) was held
5. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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inadmissible. 6 The courts, in extending Frye's applicability to
virtually all types of scientific methodologies, made the Frye
standard the predominant test for admissibility of scientific
evidence for much of the twentieth century.7
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8 the
Supreme Court held that the Frye standard was superceded by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs expert testimony.9
The Court could find nothing in the text or history of Rule 702
to suggest that it incorporated Frye's "general acceptance"
standard. 10  Furthermore, the Court believed Frye's rigid
standard to be inconsistent with the "liberal thrust of the
Federal Rules."11 In response to these concerns, the Court
promulgated a new standard for admission of scientific expert
testimony, focusing on relevance and reliability, which are
prerequisites for admission of any kind of evidence. 12 The
Court clarified the reliability prong by stating that "[i]n a case
involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be
based upon scientific validity." 3 The Daubert Court charged
the trial judge to undertake a "preliminary assessment of
6. Id. at 1013-14.
7. See, e.g., Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1197, 1205 & n.47 (1980); S.J. Graham, supra note 2, at 233 & nn.17-18
(stating that at least thirty-three states used the Frye standard during the
twenty year period ending in 1995 and providing examples of the diverse types
of scientific evidence to which Frye has been applied).
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The plaintiffs in Daubert were two minor
children and their parents, suing for birth defects allegedly caused by the
mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug marketed by the
defendant. Id. at 582. Daubert is applied in all federal courts. See, e.g., Horn,
185 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (applying Daubert to the challenged admissibility of
field sobriety tests, including horizontal gaze nystagmus).
9. FED. R. EVID. 702. At the time of the Daubert decision, Rule 702
stated, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. Congress amended the Rule in 2000 in response to
Daubert and its progeny to add the following phrase: "if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID. 702 & advisory
committee's note.
10. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
11. Id. at 588.
12. Id. at 589-92.
13. Id. at 590 n.9.
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whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."14
This "gatekeeping"15 role of the trial judge follows directly from
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), which states that
"[p]reliminary questions concerning.., the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court."16 Finally, the
Daubert Court provided some general guidelines to aid trial
judges in determining whether particular scientific evidence is
scientifically valid and serves as an aid to the jury in
evaluating a fact in issue: (1) Can the scientific knowledge be
tested or has it been tested; (2) has the "theory or technique...
been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) does the
technique have a "known or potential rate of error"; and (4) is
there "general acceptance" of the scientific technique.1 7 The
fourth guideline is essentially the Frye standard. 18
The Frye and Daubert opinions have considerable
commonality in their concerns and practical solutions. Both
recognize the challenge in defining the point at which
experimental science, which is constantly evolving, becomes
sufficiently firm to aid in the resolution of a specific legal
dispute. 19 Most obvious with regard to their commonality is
that the Frye "general acceptance" standard is one of the
Daubert guidelines.20 But the importance of acceptance in the
larger scientific community is not limited to only one of
Daubert's specific guidelines. Acceptance is also an aspect of
Daubert's definition of scientific knowledge: While "'scientific'
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science,"
knowledge "applies to any body of known facts or to any body of
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds."21 Furthermore, Daubert points out that the latitude
granted expert witnesses in their testimony is "premised on an
assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis
14. Id. at 592-93.
15. Id. at 592, 597.
16. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
17. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
18. See id. at 594; Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.(
1923).
19. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
21. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD





in the knowledge and experience of his discipline."22 In a
recent application of Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that
the judicial gatekeeping function "is to make certain that an
expert.., employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field."23 Thus Daubert and its progeny incorporate
the concepts of factual knowledge, experience, and intellectual
rigor appropriate to a scientific discipline. This incorporation
suggests that the Daubert standard does indeed give
considerable deference to the generally accepted dimensions
and definitions of scientific expertise.
In spite of the above similarities between Frye and
Daubert, controversy over the relative merits and weaknesses
of each has been voluminous and intense. Many judges and
other scholars have criticized Frye for placing too much
responsibility for decisions regarding admissibility of scientific
evidence in the hands of scientists, who are uneducated in the
law.24 Since the only question under Frye is whether the
principle or test has attained the level of "general acceptance"
in the relevant scientific community, 25 some argue that the
judge has essentially abdicated his role to the scientists. 26
Conversely, others have opined that the Daubert standard puts
judges in the "position of being amateur scientists and
determining the reliability of information."27 At least some
22. Id. at 592.
23. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
24. See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 395-96 (Alaska 1999)
(suggesting, in an opinion that replaced the Frye standard with the Daubert
standard, that "(tihe notion that scientists are better suited than judges for
assessing scientific reliability may appear initially persuasive, given that trial
judges are rarely trained in science ... [but ciloser consideration reveals that
the notion is misleading and irrelevant"); Gildea, supra note 2, at 108
(suggesting, in a comparison of Frye and Daubert standards, that "[tihe
Daubert standard recognizes that trial judges, not scientists or technicians,
are best suited to decide what evidence is admissible"); Harley, supra note 2,
at 507-08 ("The heyday of Frye is long past. The Federal Rules of Evidence
hailed an era of judicial responsibility in which it is no longer appropriate for
judges to abdicate decision-making to the scientific community.").
25. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
26. See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. Holmgren, supra note 2, at 599 (paraphrasing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01); Milich, supra note 2, at
919 ("Scientists who have spent [most] of their professional lives wrestling
with the complexities and mysteries of their disciplines must be amazed at the
law's hubris in thinking that non-scientist judges can 'get up to speed' on a
scientific dispute and ultimately decide who has the better of the argument.");
1584 [Vol 87:1579
2003] FRYE VERSUS DAUBERT 1585
judges, including Judge Kozinski, who presided over the
Daubert trial on remand from the Supreme Court, have found
this a daunting task:
The first prong of Daubert puts federal judges in an uncomfortable
position.
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the Supreme
Court's opinion, is to resolve disputes among respected, well-
credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise,
in areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what
is not "good science," and occasionally to reject such expert testimony
because it was not "derived by the scientific method."
28
Hence, in simplistic terms, the controversy over
admissibility of scientific evidence has often been framed as a
question of who should have control: judges, who usually know
little about science, or scientists, who usually know little about
law and the legal system.
II. TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND STATES
CHOSEN FOR ANALYSIS
This Note examines three types of scientific evidence on
which both Frye and Daubert jurisdictions have ruled in the
past decade to look for patterns with regard to decisions on
admissibility. Part II.A, immediately below, describes the
scientific background behind these three types of evidence.
Part II.B details the criteria by which states were chosen for
analysis.
A. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
The three types of scientific evidence chosen for analysis
Montz, supra note 2, at 106 (noting the "paradoxical assumption [in Daubert]
that trial judges, as gatekeepers, can effectively and competently apply their
level of scientific knowledge to determine the reliability of all sciences ... as
well or conceivably better than each individual well-credentialed scientist who
proffers their [sic] evidence"); Tamarelli, supra note 2, at 1202-03 ("Our
system should not contemplate that judges and juries can make amateur
assessments of the merits of new research. That work should be left to the
more capable scientific community.").
28. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir.
1995). Justice Breyer echoed these concerns in his concurring opinion in
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, which stated that the judge's gatekeeper role
"will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and sophisticated determinations
about scientific methodology," and that "judges are not scientists and do not
have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such decisions."
522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997).
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are: DNA profiles using the PCR-STR technique, horizontal
gaze nystagmus (HGN) as a field sobriety test, and child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). DNA methodologies
are highly technical, ."hard" science. 29 HGN testing is based on
measurement of a clinical ocular response. 30 CSAAS is an
example of psychological science, developed by astute
observation of human behavior and thus in the category of
"soft" science. 3'
1. PCR-STR DNA Profiles
DNA evidence is well established in the courtroom, and the
power of DNA profiling as a unique molecular identifier is
seriously questioned neither by prosecutors nor by defense
attorneys. 32  But science is rarely static.33  Progress in
molecular biology is continually pushing the basic DNA
methodology in new and unexpected directions, and these new
techniques for analyzing DNA have elicited numerous
29. David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles, and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in
Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 21 n.2, 29-30 (1986) (discussing the
distinction between "hard" and "soft" sciences).
30. NAT'L TRAFFIC LAW CTR., AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,
HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS: THE SCIENCE AND THE LAw 4-5 (1999).
31. McCord, supra note 29, at 21 n.1, 27 (describing psychological
methods of research, i.e., observation of individuals, correlation of behaviors,
and inference).
32. See, e.g., State v. Grant, No. CR6481390, 2002 WL 853627, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2002) ("[Nluclear DNA evidence is so generally
accepted at the present time by advocates on all sides of the criminal justice
system that a successful challenge to the general methodology of DNA testing
would be unlikely in the extreme."); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 989
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) ("[I]t is clear that there is general scientific acceptance of
the theory underlying DNA identification."). Richard Lempter, in After the
DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRCII, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 439 (1997), writes,
DNA is an extremely valuable identification technique-far better, for
example, than eyewitness testimony, which is often treated as
dispositive in determining "'who did it'." I know no critic of DNA
evidence who wants to return to a pre-DNA world. All, I think, agree
that DNA evidence leads to more correct convictions of the guilty and
fewer mistaken convictions of the innocent than occurred before
DNA's arrival on the scene.
Id. at 441.
33. See, e.g., People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2000) (affirming, in the
context of HGN testing, that newly acquired information requires
reexamination of the validity of scientific tests); COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC
SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE 47, 53, 69-73 (1996) (summarizing newly developed and still
developing DNA profiling methods).
1586
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questions in the courts. 34 One important new DNA profiling
technique, known as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
method, has the advantage of requiring a much smaller sample
than the initial methods used in DNA forensic analysis.35 An
accurate description of PCR is "molecular Xeroxing," in that a
very small amount of DNA is used as a template to form
numerous exact copies, thereby allowing analysis of the minute
amounts of DNA to be found on many forensic samples (e.g.,
traces of saliva on a cigarette butt).36 Other advantages of PCR
are that a single sample can be divided for replicate testing in
several laboratories (since such small amounts of material are
needed for analysis) and that even degraded DNA, which for
example is likely to be found in a decayed body, is often
suitable for analysis.37  PCR is sufficiently different in
methodology and in its sources of error from the original DNA
forensic techniques that the courts have appropriately taken a
hard look at its applicability to the judicial process. 38
PCR does not refer to a single forensic technique, but
rather to a variety of possible procedures, depending on which
segment of the DNA is to be amplified. 39 This Note focuses on
one particular PCR-based method, known as PCR-STR, for
PCR-short-tandem-repeats. 40 As their name implies, STRs are
short sequences of DNA that are repeated many times in a
row.41 STRs are common, are widely distributed in the genome,
and are coming into widespread use in forensic science. 42
2. Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN)
In contrast to the highly technical methodology of DNA
typing, the second technique considered in this Note, known as
34. See, e.g., COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., supra note 33, at 69-73, 174-
85 (summarizing new DNA profiling methods, some legal questions that have
arisen therefrom, and how courts have dealt with such questions).
35. See, e.g., id. at 70 ("Because the amplification is almost unlimited,
PCR-based methods make possible the analysis of very tiny amounts of
DNA.").
36. See, e.g., Grant, 2002 WL 853627 at *1-*2 (citing the testimony of Dr.
Carll Ladd, a "thoroughly credible witness" who referred to PCR as "molecular
Xeroxing"); COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., supra note 33, at 69-73.
37. See, e.g., COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI., supra note 33, at 70.
38. See, e.g., id. at 70-71, 175-79.
39. See, e.g., id. at 70-73 (describing several PCR-based methods).





horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), relies on very simple
technology-a pen.43 HGN is typically administered by a police
officer as part of a field sobriety test for individuals suspected
of driving under the influence of alcohol: The officer holds a pen
or similar object in front of the driver, moves it slowly from side
to side, and observes the movement of the subject's eyes as they
attempt to follow the moving object.44 Normally, the subject's
eyes follow the moving object smoothly; however, if he or she
has ingested alcohol or certain other drugs, the eyes exhibit an
involuntary jerking motion as they attempt to follow the
object.45 This jerking motion is known as a nystagmus. A
study sponsored by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration "determined that the HGN test was seventy-
seven percent accurate in detecting whether an individual's
[blood alcohol content] was .10 or higher."46  Although
jurisdictions have taken varied approaches to the question of
admissibility of HGN evidence, most state courts consider HGN
a scientific test and apply their usual standards for
admissibility of scientific evidence.47
3. Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)
The third type of testimony to be examined, Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), is drawn from the
study of human behavior.48 Clinical studies have shown that
children who have been sexually abused exhibit a typical
profile of behavior that is counterintuitive to adult
expectations. 49 There are five characteristics of the CSAAS
profile. First, the child is secretive about the abuse: "The
average child never asks and never tells.... [This is] [c]ontrary
43. NAT'L TRAFFIC LAW CTR., supra note 30, at 12.
44. Id. at 12-14.
45. Id. at 4-5. Alcohol is a central nervous system depressant that affects
numerous motor control systems, including reflexes, hand movements, and
body posture, as well as eye movements. Id. at 5 (citing Jack E. Richman &
John Jakobowski, The Competency and Accuracy of Police Academy Recruits in
the Use of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test for Detecting Alcohol
Impairment, 47 NEW. ENG. J. OPTOMETRY 5, 6 (Winter 1994)).
46. NAT'L TRAFFIC LAW CTR., supra note 30, at 9 & n.26 (citing NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FIELD
EvALUATION OF A BEHAVIORAL TEST BATTERY FOR DWI, No. DOT-HS-806-475,
at 4 (Sept. 1983)).
47. NAT'L TRAFFIC LAW CTR., supra note 30, at 19-22.
48. Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 180 (1983).
49. Id. at 180-81.
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to the general expectation that the victim would normally seek
help."50  Second, the child appears helpless: "The normal
reaction [of the child] is to 'play possum'. . . . Small creatures
simply do not call on force to deal with [the] overwhelming
threat" of a much larger and more powerful adult.51 Third, the
child exhibits signs of entrapment and accommodation: "The
only acceptable alternative for the [sexually abused] child is to
believe that she has provoked the painful encounters and to
hope that by learning to be good she can earn love and
acceptance." 52 Fourth, when the child does speak about the
abuse, her disclosure is "delayed, conflicted and
unconvincing."53 Finally, the child is likely to retract her initial
statements about sexual abuse, often because she feels
responsible for the aftermath. 54
Professionals who counsel sexually abused children are
often asked to testify in court proceedings in order to help the
fact finder understand the victim's behavior, which seems not
only incongruous but also dishonest. 55 Such testimony cannot
prove that any particular child was abused, much less whether
the defendant was the abuser, but it can help a jury to
understand inconsistencies in the victim's story.56
CSAAS is an example of a psychological syndrome that has
been developed and studied in the context of professional
clinical observations of and interactions with similarly afflicted
individuals. 57  Such behavioral studies are not readily
amenable to testing via the standard scientific method, where a
hypothesis is formulated, experimentally tested with known
error rates, and then objectively accepted or rejected based on
the experimental data. Therefore, knowledge based on
experience and observation, such as CSAAS, presents
admissibility challenges distinct from more technical
knowledge; nonetheless, in many jurisdictions, both types of
50. Id. at 181.
51. Id. at 183.
52. Id. at 184.
53. Id. at 186.
54. Id. at 188.
55. See, e.g., Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony: Seeking an
Appropriate Admissibility Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual
Abuse Prosecutions, 48 DuKE L.J. 933, 942-43 (1999) (acknowledging the work
of Dr. Summit, supra note 48, who identified and defined CSAAS to aid
professionals in counseling sexually abused children).
56. Id. at 947-48.
57. McCord, supra note 29, at 21 n.1, 27; Summit, supra note 48, at 180.
2003] 1589
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expertise are evaluated by the same admissibility standard. 58
B. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING STATES FOR ANALYSIS
This Note compares state court opinions after 1993 from
Frye and Daubert jurisdictions regarding admissibility of the
three scientific techniques described in the previous section. In
each case, one party offered scientific testimony and the other
party objected to the offering. In all but one case, the dispute
reached the appellate level. The analysis is focused on states
that followed the Frye standard prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert.59 These states are divided into two groups
for comparison: those that continued to follow Frye after the
Daubert decision (Frye states) and those that at some time after
1993 switched to a Daubert standard in line with the Supreme
Court's ruling (Daubert states). Limiting the analysis to states
that followed the Frye standard, at least immediately prior to
the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert in 1993, creates a
baseline from which differences should be more readily
discernable after the switch to Daubert.
The majority of states analyzed adhere to a rule of evidence
similar or identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Testimony
by Experts.60 Most states also share other, more general rules
of evidence. 61 Particularly relevant are state rules analogous to
Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 403. These rules place
squarely on the court the responsibility for addressing
preliminary questions of admissibility, taking into account not
just the probative value of any evidence but also any dangers of
58. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 29, at 82-88 (opining that the Frye test is
inappropriate for psychological and other "soft" scientific evidence); Steele,
supra note 55, at 954-57.
59. Before the Daubert decision, most states followed Frye. See supra note
7.
60. See supra note 9 (providing the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
in both pre-2000 and amended post-2000 forms); Hamilton, supra note 1, at
210-13 (providing a table listing the states that have adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 or a similar variant thereof). The three states that have not
adopted a rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 are Massachusetts,
New York, and Pennsylvania. Id. Connecticut adopted Rule 702 in 2000
(after the Hamilton Note was published). CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 7-2.
61. See, e.g., Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is the
Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK.
L. REV. 641, 641-42 & n.2, 658 n.124 (1992) (listing the thirty-four states that
have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence); S.J. Graham, supra note 2, at
255 & n.145 ("Evidence codes based on the Federal Rules of Evidence have
been adopted by thirty-four states.").
1590 [Vol 87:1579
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unfair prejudice or confusion that its admission might raise.62
Thus the framework of evidentiary principles, under which
either Frye or Daubert standards must function, is very similar
in nearly all of the states analyzed. 63
In the following sections, court decisions with regard to
each of the chosen scientific techniques (PCR-STR DNA
profiling, HGN, and CSAAS) are compared and contrasted in
Frye and Daubert jurisdictions, with particular attention to the
rationale that each court used in arriving at its decision. For
each type of evidence, this Note analyzes nearly all appellate
decisions on admissibility after 1993 from states that meet the
criteria described above. The types of scientific techniques
analyzed herein were chosen because appellate courts in
several Frye and Daubert states had considered the question of
their admissibility as novel scientific evidence.
III. DNA PROFILES USING THE PCR-STR METHOD
A. DAUBERT STATES ADMIT PCR-STR DNA EVIDENCE
Many courts have ruled on the admissibility of PCR-STR
DNA profiling since 1997, when the first appellate case to
address this technique was reported in Massachusetts. 64 In
upholding a first degree murder conviction, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held PCR-STR DNA evidence admissible
under the Daubert standard. 65 The holding was based largely
62. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) reads in relevant part, "Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court." Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may
be excluded by the court if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
63. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining
and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 256 (1984);
supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. States which have not adopted a
text similar or identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence are identified in the
discussions of the opinions from those states.
64. Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Mass. 1997).
65. Id. at 741. Massachusetts has followed the Daubert standard for
admissibility of scientific evidence since 1994, when the state supreme court
indicated its choice of Daubert over its previous Frye standard.
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348-49 (Mass. 1994).
Massachusetts does not have a codified law of evidence. Salken, supra note
61, at 642 n.2. However, the state supreme court in Lanigan noted that Rule
702 of the Massachusetts Proposed Rules of Evidence was identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702. 641 N.E.2d at 1348.
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on positive comments from the National Research Council
about the forensic utility of the test and from nonjudicial
experience with the test in identifying the remains of soldiers
killed in Operation Desert Storm in 1991.66
Connecticut followed its neighbor to the north in admitting
PCR-STR DNA evidence several years later. 67 After a hearing
prompted by defendant's motion to exclude such evidence from
his murder trial, the Superior Court of Connecticut issued a
strong statement of approval of PCR-STR DNA testing:
Scientific research is a national-or global-phenomenon, and there
is no need for a court in one state to disregard the judicial decisions of
other jurisdictions. While a single appellate decision in one state does
not automatically settle the issue, at some point the combined weight
of judicial and scientific opinion achieves the critical mass of
persuasive authority. With respect to STR evidence ... that point
has now been reached. There is overwhelming evidence that the STR
technique has gained general acceptance. This conclusion should end
the court's inquiry, and the conclusions derived from that
methodology should be held admissible.6"
This Daubert court reached its conclusion (which, in its
reliance upon general acceptance sounds very much like a Frye
decision) after consideration of a number of factors: the
testimony of a supervisor at the State Forensic Science
Laboratory; 69 conclusions reached by the 1996 NRC Report and
66. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d at 743. The court noted several conclusions of the
National Research Council: PCR-STR is "coming into wide use," "STR loci
appear to be particularly appropriate for forensic use," and PCR-STR testing is
similar in principle to the previously accepted and widely used methodologies.
Id. (quoting NRC DNA REPORT, supra note 33, at 35, 71, 117). The court also
noted that, although the defendant had questioned the reliability of PCR-STR,
he offered "no specific scientific or forensic evidence or literature ... to
support" his contention. Id.
67. State v. Grant, No. CR6481390, 2002 WL 853627, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 9, 2002). The Connecticut Supreme Court abandoned Frye and
adopted Daubert in State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 743, 750-51 (Conn. 1997).
The Grant court noted that Connecticut Code of Evidence § 7-2, adopted after
Porter was decided, was consistent with Porter and also supported the
admissibility of PCR-STR DNA evidence. Grant, 2002 WL 853627, at *4, *7.
Connecticut Code of Evidence § 7-2 is similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
68. Grant, 2002 WL 853627, at *7 (citations omitted). This holding
suggests that the general acceptance inquiry was determinative, even though
Connecticut follows the Daubert standard. Such a view is consistent with an
observation of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, which also held that
Daubert was the appropriate state standard: "We suspect that general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community will continue to be the
significant, and often the only, issue." Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d at 1349.
69. Grant, 2002 WL 853627, at *1-2.
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numerous other, peer-reviewed publications; 70 and appellate
decisions in several other states.71 At the end of the opinion,
"[i]n the event that a reviewing court should disagree with [the]
conclusion,"72 the court briefly mentioned a few Daubert
factors. Specifically, the PCR-STR technique was reliable and
objectively verifiable, with a low rate of error and well-defined
standards; it was initially developed for research, not for
purposes of adjudication. 73  Thus the Connecticut court
conducted a Daubert analysis, but appeared to rely most
strongly on the general acceptance test in admitting PCR-STR
DNA evidence.
B. FRYE STATES ADMIT PCR-STR DNA EVIDENCE
Beginning in 1998, many appellate courts in Frye states
confronted PCR-STR DNA evidence; nearly all ruled favorably
on its admissibility. 74 Nebraska was the first Frye state to
address PCR-STR DNA evidence in a published opinion, which
arose in the context of an unsuccessful appeal of a first degree
murder conviction. 75  After a Frye hearing at which a
pathologist and a scientist with extensive DNA experience
testified, the trial court concluded that the state had met its
burden of establishing general acceptance both of PCR-STR
DNA methods and of the specific PCR-STR test procedure used
on the defendant's samples. 76 The Nebraska Supreme Court
agreed, holding that "the PCR STR DNA test used in the
instant case was generally accepted within the scientific
community."77 The supreme court further found that the test
was conducted properly, according to the established protocol,
based on trial testimony by the laboratory technician who
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id. at *6.
72. Id. at *7.
73. Id.
74. People v. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 117-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
People v. Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Yisrael v. State,
827 So. 2d 113, 114-15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d
402, 406-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Traylor, No. C6-01-244, 2003
WL 473847, at *7 (Minn. Feb. 24, 2003); State v. Salmon, 89 S.W.3d 540, 545
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Jackson, 582 N.W.2d 317, 325 (Neb. 1998); State
v. Deloatch, 804 A.2d 604, 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). For a trial
court opinion, see People v. Owens, 725 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180, 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2001).
75. Jackson, 582 N.W.2d at 324-25.
76. Id. at 322, 324, 325.
77. Id. at 325.
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performed the test. 78 Several other jurisdictions that adhere to
the Frye type of admissibility test have followed Nebraska's
lead.
California, Florida, New York, Minnesota, Missouri, and
New Jersey, all of which follow the Frye standard, admitted
PCR-STR DNA evidence between 1999 and 2003.79 The courts
in each case cited the general acceptance of PCR-STR DNA in
the relevant scientific community, 80 although the New York
court pointed out that "[g]eneral scientific acceptance, not
universal acceptance, is required."81  Nearly all the courts
heard testimony from expert witnesses familiar with the
technique, but the training of the expert called to testify varied
from state to state.82 The various expert witnesses ranged from
a deputy director of the company that conducted the DNA test,
in the California court;83 to a professor of genetics, in the
Missouri court;84 to state forensic scientists, in the Missouri
and New Jersey courts.85 At least three courts also mentioned
the large number of scientific and/or forensic publications
concerning PCR-STR technology and use.86 In Deloatch, the
78. Id. at 325-26.
79. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119; Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659; Yisrael,
827 So. 2d at 114-15; Lemour, 802 So. 2d at 406-08; Traylor, 2003 WL 473847,
at *13; Salmon, 89 S.W.3d at 545; Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 613; Owens, 725
N.Y.S.2d at 180, 182. California follows the Frye standard, as described in
People v. Kelly. 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976). Minnesota follows a
double prong Frye standard in which the first prong asks whether the novel
scientific technique is "generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community," and the second prong asks "whether the laboratory conducting
the tests in the individual case complied with appropriate standards and
controls." State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 818-19 (Minn. 2002). New
Jersey retains the Frye standard of admissibility for criminal cases, although
it adheres to the Daubert standard for toxic tort claims. State v. Harvey, 699
A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997); Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 613. New York follows Frye,
but has not codified its laws of evidence. Owens, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 180, 182;
Salken, supra note 61, at 642 n.2.
80. Supra note 79.
81. Owens, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 181.
82. Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659; Yisrael, 827 So. 2d at 114; Lemour, 802
So. 2d at 406; Traylor, 2003 WL 473847, at *6; Salmon, 89 S.W.3d at 544-45;
Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 605.
83. Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659.
84. Salmon, 89 S.W.3d at 544-45.
85. Id.; Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 605.
86. Traylor, 2003 WL 473847, at *6 & nn.5-6; Lemour, 802 So. 2d at 405-
06; Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 610. The Lemour court singled out the NRC DNA
Report as particularly compelling in Florida: "The Florida Supreme Court
views the NRC reports as authoritative sources on DNA forensic use."
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New Jersey court noted that the defense had offered neither
any specific criticism nor any expert testimony.8 7 Finally, all
the courts cited decisions from other jurisdictions that had
previously admitted PCR-STR DNA evidence.88 Thus, the
seven Frye states discussed above have addressed PCR-STR
DNA testing and have found it to be admissible, in agreement
with the two Daubert states previously discussed. 89
IV. HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS (HGN)
Numerous Frye and Daubert jurisdictions have ruled on
the admissibility of HGN testing as evidence of intoxication or
impairment. 90 In all but one case discussed in this section (and
in nearly all cases involving HGN evidence), the state has
charged the defendant with driving under the influence of
alcohol. 91
A. DAUBERT STATES DIFFER WITH REGARD TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
HGN EVIDENCE
Two Daubert states have recently reached opposite
conclusions regarding the admissibility of HGN. 92 In South
Lemour, 802 So. 2d at 405 n.7.
87. Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 606.
88. People v. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 117-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659; Traylor, 2003 WL 473847, at *7; Lemour, 802
So. 2d at 405; Salmon, 89 S.W.3d at 545; Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 612; Owens,
725 N.Y.S.2d at 181-82.
89. See supra Parts III.A & B. At least two other states, which do not fit
the criteria established for this Note, have also admitted PCR-STR DNA
evidence. The supreme courts of Colorado and Utah admitted PCR-STR DNA
evidence on the basis of their respective state rules of evidence regarding
expert testimony, which are both identical to the pre-2000 Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. COLO. R. EVID. 702; UTAH R. EVID. 702; People v. Shreck, 22
P.3d 68, 77 & n.10, 82-83 (Colo. 2001); State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1139,
1143 (Utah 2001). See supra note 9 for the text of the pre-2000 and amended
Rule 702.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 551-53, 561 (D.
Md. 2002). States have almost uniformly excluded HGN testing as evidence of
a specific blood alcohol level, as opposed to evidence of alcohol consumption,
intoxication, and/or impairment. See, e.g., id. at 534 & n.10.
91. Occasionally, states have considered HGN as evidence of impairment
by drugs other than alcohol. See, e.g., State v. Baity, 991 P.2d 1151, 1153
(Wash. 2000). Baity is the only opinion discussed in this Note that considered
HGN as a test for intoxication by drugs other than alcohol. See id. at 1153,
1158-59.
92. See State v. Torres, 976 P.2d 20, 23 (N.M. 1999); State v. Lasworth, 42
P.3d 844, 844 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 42 P.3d 842 (N.M. 2002);
State v. Hullinger, 649 N.W.2d 253, 260-61 (S.D. 2002). South Dakota
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Dakota, the supreme court admitted HGN after an
interlocutory appeal from the prosecutor. 93 The state presented
three witnesses at a pretrial Daubert hearing: the officer
administering the test, a training director for state law
enforcement, and an optometrist.94 The court cited not only the
expert testimony but also legal precedent in holding that "HGN
testing is nationally recognized as a reliable field sobriety test
and if it can be shown that the test was properly administered
by a trained officer, such evidence should be admitted for a jury
to consider at trial."95
New Mexico had a different view. 96 In State v. Torres, the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
admitting HGN testing because the state did not show the
evidentiary reliability of such testing.97 Similar to the South
Dakota Supreme Court,98 the New Mexico court considered
HGN as scientific evidence that must meet the evidentiary
reliability standard of Daubert.99 Since the "trial court did not
consider any of the required factors for assessing the
evidentiary reliability of HGN testing," the supreme court
found reversible error in the decision to admit the testimony of
the officer who administered the test. 100 The court stated that
testimony from police officers, who in general are not experts
with regard to the scientific basis of HGN testing, cannot
establish the reliability of the test. 10 1 The court expounded
stringent requirements for the officer's testimony, noting that it
adopted the Daubert standard in State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D.
1994). New Mexico rejected Frye as a "controlling standard of admissibility"
at approximately the same time, citing with favor the Daubert criteria. See
State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 202-04 (N.M. 1993) (quoting United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)).
93. See Hullinger, 649 N.W.2d at 254.
94. See id. at 255.
95. Id. at 260-61.
96. See Torres, 976 P.2d at 23; Lasworth, 42 P.3d at 844.
97. 976 P.2d at 23.
98. See Hullinger, 649 N.W.2d at 258 n.3.
99. See Torres, 976 P.2d at 28, 30.
100. Id. at 31.
101. See id. at 32. That the officer had training and experience with HGN
testing in practice was not denied, but was considered "not sufficiently
probative of the test's evidentiary reliability." Id. The officer could testify
about the "administration and specific results" of the test "provided that
another, scientific expert first establishes the evidentiary reliability of the
scientific principles underlying the test." Id. at 34.
1596 [Vol 87:1579
20031 FRYE VERSUS DAUBERT 1597
"did not explain how the test proved intoxication."'0 2 Finally,
the court refused to take judicial notice of HGN testing as it is
not "a subject of common and general knowledge ... [nor a
matter] that is well established and authoritatively settled."10 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Torres did not decide
"whether HGN testing is adequately valid from a scientific
point of view." 104 A subsequent appellate decision from New
Mexico, however, excluded HGN evidence in spite of the
prosecution's offering of additional testimony with regard to its
scientific reliability.' 05 No doubt mindful of the court's holding
in Torres,10 6 the prosecution in State v. Lasworth offered as an
expert witness Dr. Marcelline Burns, a psychologist who has
experience in the development, validation, and administration
of HGN testing and who had previously testified as an expert
witness concerning HGN in more than half of the states. 10 7
After receiving the testimony of this expert witness and
reviewing her published works, the Lasworth court found that
HGN "arguably has been scientifically validated" to identify
drivers whose blood alcohol level is above the statutory limit,
but it "has not been scientifically validated as a direct measure
of impairment."'0 8 The court's antagonism toward the expert
witness' testimony and toward HGN testing in general was
only thinly concealed. 109
102. Id. at 33. At present no expert testimony can explain how HGN
proves intoxication. Such explanation would require a biological mechanism
linking alcohol consumption and impairment with ocular physiology, a path
that science cannot as yet delineate.
103. Id. (quoting Rozelle v. Barnard, 382 P.2d 180, 181 (N.M. 1963)).
104. Id.
105. See State v. Lasworth, 42 P.3d 844, 844, 846 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001),
cert. denied, 42 P.3d 842 (N.M. 2002).
106. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
107. Lasworth, 42 P.3d at 846-48.
108. Id. at 848. This holding is nearly the opposite of most courts, which
accept HGN testing as a measure of impairment but not as a determinant of
any particular blood alcohol content. See supra note 90.
109. See Lasworth, 42 P.3d at 849. "Evidence that Dr. Burns was qualified
in the abstract to design and conduct studies of HGN does not mean that she
in fact designed and conducted scientifically sound studies.... [Tihe court
could not be sure the results obtained by Dr. Burns and other HGN
researchers were not a 'coincidence."' Id. The court also questioned the
statistical significance of some of the validation studies on which the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration relied. Id. In the published opinion
there is no indication that the defense countered the prosecution's claims
concerning HGN with its own experts. Id. at 847-50. The court seemed to rely
on one general source for its cautionary note that "even the highest quality
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In State v. Pjura, an appellate court adhering to Daubert
issued an opinion similar to the New Mexico Supreme Court
opinion in Torres."I 0 The court declined the state's invitation to
"declare that the HGN test has gained general acceptance in
the scientific community" or to decide "whether the HGN test
meets the Daubert standard for scientific validity." I '
Thus of the three Daubert states that meet this Note's
criteria, one (South Dakota) has embraced HGN evidence, one
(New Mexico) has excluded it, and one (Connecticut) has
declined to take judicial notice. 12
B. MOST FRYE STATES ADMIT HGN EVIDENCE
In 2000, the Nebraska Supreme Court overruled its
previous decision" 13 and held that "the HGN ... test meets the
Frye standard for acceptance in the relevant scientific
[scientific] journals sometimes publish work that is later found to be wrong."
Id. (quoting 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.3.3 (1997)). The immediately
preceding statement seems to suggest an antagonism toward scientific
evidence that goes beyond this particular expert and this technique.
110. See State v. Pjura, 789 A.2d 1124, 1134 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); State v.
Torres, 976 P.2d 20, 32-33 (N.M. 1999); supra note 101 and text accompanying
notes 98-104. The Pjura court found that State v. Russo, 773 A.2d 965 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2001), was dispositive. Pjura, 789 A.2d at 1131-33. In Russo, the
court held that HGN was scientific evidence that must satisfy the Daubert
standard for admissibility prior to admission of the testimony of the police
officer who administered the test. 773 A.2d at 969.
111. Pjura, 789 A.2d at 1133.
112. A fourth Daubert state that meets the criteria of this Note is West
Virginia. See State v. Wyatt, 482 S.E.2d 147, 158-59 (W. Va. 1996); Wilt v.
Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 200-03 (W. Va. 1993). West Virginia's view of HGN
is hard to discern at present, apparently reflecting a divided supreme court.
In the most recent relevant West Virginia Supreme Court decision, Judge
Starcher wrote a separate concurring opinion "to point out that despite
intimations to the contrary in... the Court's opinion in the instant case, West
Virginia law does not permit the admission of... [HGN] evidence as
substantive evidence of intoxication, without the reliability of the HGN
evidence being shown." State v. Dilliner, 569 S.E.2d 211, 218 (W. Va. 2002)
(Starcher, J., concurring). Judge Starcher agreed with the Torres court in
New Mexico that "[tihe training of a police officer to perform HGN
observations and evaluations does not provide the officer with the expert
qualifications to establish HGN evidence's scientific reliability." Id. at 224; see
supra note 101 and accompanying text. The concurrence was willing to admit
HGN evidence without a separate and individualized showing of reliability
only for the purpose of showing probable cause for arrest for driving under the
influence. Dilliner, 569 S.E.2d at 224.
113. See State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986), overruled by
State v. Baue, 607 N.W.2d 191 (Neb. 2000).
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communities, and when the test is given in conjunction with
other field sobriety tests, the results are admissible for the
limited purpose of establishing that a person has an
impairment which may be caused by alcohol." 14 The court was
persuaded by three expert witnesses who testified for the state
in a pretrial evidentiary hearing: a research psychologist, a
professor of optometry, and the director of training for the
Nebraska State Patrol. 115 In addition to accepting the scientific
principles on which HGN testing is based, the court concluded
that the police officer who administered the HGN test could
testify to the results obtained, and the only foundation needed
for his testimony was to show "that the officer has been
adequately trained in the administration and assessment of the
HGN test and has conducted the testing and assessment in
accordance with that training. "116
Several other Frye states have reached a conclusion similar
to that of Nebraska with regard to HGN. 117 In State v. Hill,
decided in 1993, the Missouri Court of Appeals held HGN
admissible as evidence of intoxication. 18 Recently, in the face
114. State v. Baue, 607 N.W.2d 191, 204 (Neb. 2000). In Baue, Nebraska
used the Frye standard for admissibility of scientific evidence, the standard in
effect at that time. Id. However, a year after Baue was decided, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that Nebraska would follow Daubert as of October 1,
2001. See Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Neb. 2001).
115. See Baue, 607 N.W.2d at 201-04. The expert research psychologist,
Dr. Marcelline Burns, was the same one who testified for the Daubert state of
New Mexico in State v. Lasworth, where her reception was considerably less
positive. 42 P.3d 844, 846-47; see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
116. Baue, 607 N.W.2d at 205.
117. See Ballard v. State, 955 P.2d 931, 934-36, 939, 942 (Alaska Ct. App.
1998); People v. Joehnk, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 584-85 (Minn. 1994); State v. Rose, 86 S.W.3d 90,
97-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993), overruled on other grounds en banc by State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518,
520 (Mo. 1997); State v. Baue, 607 N.W.2d 191, 204 (Neb. 2000); State v.
Baity, 991 P.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Wash. 2000). In Baity the issue was
intoxication by a drug other than alcohol. See id. at 1153, 1159; supra note 91.
The Baity court held that HGN testing satisfied the Frye test, but limited its
opinion to situations in which HGN testing was just one part of a twelve step
drug recognition protocol. See Baity, 991 P.2d at 1159-60.
118. See Hill, 865 S.W.2d at 704. The Missouri court found that the HGN
test had reached the level of "general acceptance within the behavioral science
community." Id. Marcelline Burns, Ph.D., the same psychologist who later
testified for judicial proceedings in Nebraska, New Mexico, and other states on
the background, administration, and interpretation of HGN, testified for the
prosecution in Hill. See id. at 703-04; supra notes 109, 115 and accompanying
text.
Missouri adheres to a Frye standard as expounded in Alsbach v. Bader,
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of a defendant's direct challenge to reverse Hill, the Missouri
Court of Appeals affirmed the admissibility of HGN evidence,
as long as the test was performed properly by a trained
officer."19 Minnesota, California, Alaska, and Washington
admitted HGN evidence between 1994 and 2000; the HGN
evidence was admitted in each case after expert witnesses
testified at a Frye hearing. 120 The Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged that HGN was not universally accepted as a test
of drug impairment; nonetheless, the court was convinced by
testimony that the test was simple, required no elaborate
instrumentation, and had been in "common medical use
without change for many years."121 A California appellate court
agreed, concluding that "a consensus drawn from a typical
cross-section of the relevant, qualified scientific community
accepts the HGN testing procedures ... as a useful tool" in
assessing intoxication.122
A few Frye states have taken judicial notice of HGN.' 23 In
1995 Maryland's appellate court took "judicial notice of the
reliability and acceptance of the HGN test," holding that
results of the test were admissible in the state's courts without
a Frye hearing. 24 Although the trial court had not conducted a
700 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
119. See Rose, 86 S.W.3d at 97-99.
120. See Ballard, 955 P.2d at 934-36, 939, 942; Joehnk, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
7, 17; Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d at 578-79, 584-85; Baity, 991 P.2d at 1158-59.
121. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d at 584-85. The Minnesota court believed that
the real issue with regard to HGN testing was not admissibility, but rather
weight, a prerogative appropriately left to the jury. Id. at 585.
122. Joehnk, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. A year prior to the Joehnk decision,
the California Supreme Court had declined to take judicial notice of HGN,
ruling that the trial court should conduct a thorough Fyre hearing to
determine admissibility. See People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 334-35 (Cal.
1994).
123. See Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Schultz v. State, 664 A.2d 60, 69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); People v. Berger,
551 N.W.2d 421, 424 & n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
124. Schultz, 664 A.2d at 69. The authority of the court to take judicial
notice of a scientific technique was recognized in Reed v. State:
On occasion, the validity and reliability of a scientific technique may
be so broadly and generally accepted in the scientific community that
a trial court may take judicial notice of its reliability. Such is
commonly the case today with regard to ballistics tests, fingerprint
identification, blood tests, and the like.
Id. at 70-71 (quoting Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (Md. 1978)). The
Schultz court further explained that "U]udicial notice of a fact is an acceptable
substitute for formal proof of such fact, when formal proof is clearly
unnecessary to enhance the accuracy of the fact-finding process." Id. at 71
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Frye inquiry 25 and the state offered only one witness, the
arresting officer, 126 the court was convinced by the support in
the scientific literature for HGN and by its adoption in most
other jurisdictions that had addressed its admissibility. 27
Florida and Michigan courts of appeals published similar
opinions in 1996 and 1998 respectively. 28
In contrast to the nine Frye states described above which
have ruled in favor of HGN admissibility, four Frye states
within the same time period have declined to admit HGN
evidence. 29 In 2000 New Jersey declined to "take judicial
(quoting Smith v. Hearst Corp., 426 A.2d 1, 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)). The
Schultz court was persuaded by the many other jurisdictions that had already
admitted HGN evidence:
If a sufficient number of courts have examined the relevant evidence
presented on the issue in other cases and have concluded from that
evidence that the test is, or is not, generally accepted in the scientific
community, there is no reason why we have to insist that the same
evidence be presented again in the case before us.
Id. at 71.
125. Id. at 62.
126. See id. at 61.
127. See id. at 74.
128. See Williams, 710 So. 2d at 32; Berger, 551 N.W.2d at 424 & n.2. The
Michigan court held that "the prosecution was not required to present expert
testimony concerning the validity" of HGN because the test had "gained
general acceptance in the scientific community." Berger, 551 N.W.2d at 424.
Although the trial court in Florida may not have formally conducted a Frye
analysis, it did conduct a hearing on defendant's motion to exclude HGN
evidence, at which time both the prosecution and the defense presented
several expert witnesses. See Williams, 710 So. 2d at 26-28. The trial court
found that Frye was not applicable to HGN testing because, although HGN
was considered scientific, it was neither new nor novel. Id. at 29. The
appellate court labeled HGN as "quasi-scientific" and agreed that it was not
new or novel. Id. at 30. Because it was neither new nor novel, a Frye analysis
was not required: "We hold that where a scientific principle has been
established and generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and
has also been Frye tested in the legal community, it is no longer 'new or novel'
and there is simply so need to reapply a Frye analysis." Id. at 31-32. As in
Minnesota, the Florida appellate court acknowledged that HGN was not
universally accepted, but the court was convinced of the accuracy and
reliability of the test by the numerous witnesses, by the voluminous medical
literature concerning the effects of intoxicants on the body, as well as by
supportive case law. Id. at 35. In contrast, the dissent found HGN test
results unreliable and appeared unwilling to admit them for any purpose. Id.
at 48-49 (Cope, J., dissenting in part).
129. See State v. Chastain, 960 P.2d 756, 761 (Kan. 1998); Young v. City of
Brookhaven, 693 So. 2d 1355, 1362 (Miss. 1997); State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d
336, 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Commonwealth v. Stringer, 678
A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); Commonwealth v. Moore, 635 A.2d 625,
629 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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notice of the general acceptance of HGN testing in the scientific
community based upon.., independent review of authoritative,
scientific and legal writings and those judicial opinions from
other jurisdictions that have accepted HGN testing."130 While
acknowledging the conservative nature of its approach as well
as the possibility that HGN testing might meet the Frye
standard, the New Jersey court insisted that the issue first be
thoroughly litigated in a New Jersey trial court, with expert
witnesses establishing a Frye foundation. 131
In arriving at its conclusion, the New Jersey court
appeared to rely heavily on an eight-year-old decision from the
Kansas Supreme Court, which likewise declined to rule on
HGN admissibility under the Frye standard until a Kansas
trial court had an "opportunity to examine, weigh, and decide
disputed facts to determine whether the test is sufficiently
reliable to be admissible for any purpose in Kansas." 132 In
1998, the Kansas Supreme Court echoed its earlier ruling:
"We are not satisfied that [HGN] testing has achieved general
acceptance within the relevant scientific community." 33
Another Frye state reluctant to admit HGN is
Pennsylvania, where on two occasions since 1993, the superior
court has reversed the trial courts' admissions of this type of
evidence. 134 In Commonwealth v. Moore, the appellate court
did not agree that HGN testing was generally accepted "in the
field of medical science represented by ophthalmology." 135 Two
years later, when HGN admissibility was again in dispute in
Pennsylvania, the prosecution offered the testimony of an
optometrist. 136  Nonetheless, the appellate court remained
unconvinced that HGN testing was generally accepted in the
scientific community, finding that the optometrist's testimony
was "largely based on his own personal views and
130. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d at 337.
131. Id. at 342, 345.
132. Id. at 342-45 (quoting State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1121 (Kan.
1992)). In Witte, the State argued that HGN was not scientific evidence and
therefore Frye was not relevant, and, in the alternative, that HGN was
scientific evidence that satisfied Frye. 836 P.2d at 1113. The State relied on
its only witness (the arresting officer) and precedent from other states to make
its ultimately unsuccessful case that HGN evidence was reliable. Id. at 1117,
1121.
133. Chastain, 960 P.2d at 761.
134. Stringer, 678 A.2d at 1203; Moore, 635 A.2d at 629.
135. 635 A.2d at 629.
136. Stringer, 678 A.2d at 1201.
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observations."1 37 Like Pennsylvania, Mississippi has excluded
HGN evidence, although the rationale for the latter state's
exclusion is hard to discern. 138 Thus, out of a total of thirteen
Frye states that meet the criteria of this Note, four states have
excluded and nine have admitted HGN evidence. 139 Of the four
137. Id. at 1202-03 (quoting Commonwealth v. Apollo, 603 A.2d 1023, 1028
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
138. In a case of first impression, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
the HGN test is a scientific test. The potential of a juror placing
undue weight upon testimony about the administration of the test is
high....
Therefore, this Court finds that the HGN test is not generally
accepted within the scientific community and cannot be used as
scientific evidence to prove intoxication or as a mere showing of
impairment.
Young v. City of Brookhaven, 693 So.2d 1355, 1360-61 (Miss. 1997).
Unfortunately, the court did not provide any further explanation for its
rationale. See id. The Mississippi court's opinion that HGN testing is not
generally accepted does not logically follow from its fear that the jury may
place undue weight on this type of testimony. See id. These are two distinct
inquiries that the court seems to have melded.
The Alaska Court of Appeals has harshly criticized the Mississippi
Supreme Court's Brookhaven decision: "[Tihe Mississippi court's reasoning is
simply confused .... There was no factual or logical basis for the Mississippi
court's conclusion that the principles underlying HGN are not generally
accepted in the scientific community." Ballard v. State, 955 P.2d 931, 938 n.6
(Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
139. Frye states admitting HGN evidence are Alaska, California, Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Washington. See supra
Part IV.B. Frye states excluding HGN evidence are Kansas, Mississippi, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See id.
The situation with regard to HGN admissibility in another Frye state,
Illinois, remains confusing. In 2000 a plurality in the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that since the HGN test
[is] no longer "novel" in any meaningful sense ... the State should not
be put to the burden of having to reestablish the test's validity in
every case.... Where, as here, a scientific method has been shown to
be generally accepted, a Frye test is no longer necessary each time the
State seeks to use evidence obtained by that method.
People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2000) (internal citations omitted). In
reaching this decision, the court cited the routine use of HGN in prosecutions
for driving under the influence and two Illinois appellate court decisions
admitting HGN under the relevant Frye standard. Id. (citing People v.
Wiebler, 640 N.E.2d 24, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Buening, 592 N.E.2d
1222, 1227-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)). The Basler plurality also expressly
overturned an appellate decision from the third district, which had suggested
that a Frye hearing was needed in each case. Basler, 740 N.E.2d at 4
(overturning People v. Kirk, 681 N.E.2d 1073 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)).
Although one might reasonably conclude from the Basler decision that
HGN admissibility is settled in Illinois, such is not the case. Two concurring
justices in Basler concluded that since the "defendant waived any argument
20031 1603
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Daubert states considered under the same criteria, only one has
clearly held that HGN evidence is admissible in its state
courts. 140
V. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION
SYNDROME (CSAAS)
Admissibility of CSAAS has been addressed in at least two
contexts: as direct evidence of the credibility of the victim's
allegations of abuse and as rebuttal evidence following an
attack on the victim's credibility.14' The great majority of
courts have rejected CSAAS as direct evidence of the credibility
of a victim's allegations of abuse, both because of fears that
such testimony would infringe on the jury's role as fact finder
as well as because the evidence did not meet the prevailing
admissibility standards of Frye or Daubert.142 In contrast to
concerning the admissibility of... [HGNI test results by failing to raise this
argument in the trial court... the plurality's additional discussion concerning
the admissibility of HGN test results is entirely dicta without precedential
value." Id. at 5 (Heiple, J., concurring). The dissent was even harsher: "There
are several serious problems with the plurality opinion," including "a large
internal contradiction." Id. at 7 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). In the beginning
of its opinion, "the plurality unequivocally states that it expresses no opinion
on whether HGN testing meets the Frye standard"; however, "only a few
paragraphs later, the plurality states that HGN testing meets the Frye
standard.... The plurality does a disservice to the bar and to this court with
this type of analysis." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). There is some
indication that, aside from its problems with the structure of the plurality
analysis, the dissent also has some question about the admissibility of HGN
testing: "The plurality mistakenly equates being generally accepted in the
legal community with being generally accepted in the scientific community
(the standard for the Frye test)." Id. at 8 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
The first Illinois appellate decision to arise after this confusing supreme
court opinion reflected the division on the higher court. See People v. Herring,
762 N.E.2d 1186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). After reversal of a driving under the
influence conviction for reasons unrelated to HGN, the Herring majority
instructed the trial court on remand to conduct a Frye hearing on the
admissibility of HGN test evidence. Id. at 1189. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
majority view in Herring was not uniformly shared: "I disagree that a Frye
hearing is required on the HGN test. While the supreme court may not have
spoken with one voice, the supreme court has, nonetheless, spoken." Id. at
1190 (Myerscough, J., dissenting in part). Thus, in spite of several appellate
opinions regarding HGN admissibility, the philosophy of the Illinois courts
toward this type of evidence remains unpredictable.
140. Of the Daubert states, South Dakota has admitted HGN, New Mexico
has excluded it, and Connecticut and West Virginia apparently remain
undecided. See supra Part IV.A.
141. See, e.g., State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1127-31 (La. 1993).
142. See, e.g., id. at 1127-29. Foret was a case of first impression in which
the Louisiana Supreme Court analyzed admissibility of CSAAS under Daubert
1604
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this negative view of CSAAS as direct evidence of sexual abuse,
many jurisdictions have judged CSAAS more favorably when it
has been offered as rebuttal evidence to rehabilitate the victim-
witness. 143
A. DAUBERT STATES DIFFER WITH REGARD TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
REBUTTAL CSAAS EVIDENCE
In Louisiana, the supreme court admitted CSAAS to rebut
attacks on the victim's credibility.144 Specifically, the court
ruled that the expert may explain, in general terms, certain
behavior characteristics of abused children, in order to help the
jury understand reactions to abuse that seem inappropriate
and may be used to attack the victim's credibility. 145 The most
common characteristics of abused children at issue in the
courtroom are recantation of statements and delayed reporting
of the abuse. 46 The Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to treat
and Frye standards, and cited several reasons for its exclusion of CSAAS as
direct evidence of abuse. Id. at 1125-29. The court noted that CSAAS did not
have diagnostic value and was devised to aid in treatment of the victims of
sexual abuse, quoting the psychiatrist who first published on CSAAS:
CSAAS acknowledges that there is no clinical method available to
distinguish "valid" claims from those that should be treated as
fantasy or deception, and it gives no guidelines for discrimination....
CSAAS is used appropriately in court testimony not to prove a child
was molested but to rebut the myths which prejudice endorsement of
delayed or inconsistent disclosure.
Id. at 1124-25 (quoting SUMMIT, ABUSE OF THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME 160).
Another early opinion on CSAAS stated, "Credibility... is for the jury-
the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom." United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d
336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912
(9th Cir. 1973)).
143. See, e.g., Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1129-30; State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d
419, 422-24 (S.D. 1999).
144. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1129-30. In Foret, the Louisiana Supreme Court
abandoned Frye in favor of the Daubert standard. Id. at 1123. The court
based its decision to adopt Daubert on the similarity between Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and its Louisiana counterpart. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 702
(West 1995); Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123. As another aspect of its rationale for
adopting Daubert, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that it had previously
granted greater discretion to the trial judge with regard to admissibility of
scientific evidence, consistent with the Daubert standard and with a loosening
of the strict Frye general acceptance test. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123 (citing
State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 983 (La. 1979)).
145. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1129-30.
146. Id. at 1129 (citing Elizabeth Vaughan Baker, Comment, Psychological
Expert Testimony on a Child's Veracity in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 50
LA. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (1990)).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
CSAAS evidence, when used in this way, as opinion testimony
and therefore not subject to Frye or Daubert admissibility
tests. 147 A recent ruling from the Louisiana Court of Appeals
relied heavily on Foret.148 The court did not rule on whether
CSAAS would pass the Daubert standard, instead continuing to
admit CSAAS for limited purpose as opinion evidence, which
did not require a Daubert hearing. 149
Another Daubert state, South Dakota, admitted CSAAS
testimony with the same limitations as Louisiana, but with a
different rationale. 150  The South Dakota Supreme Court
allowed testimony describing the panoply of characteristics
that sexually abused children share, but the court was careful
to point out that the expert witness did not and would not have
been permitted to testify as to the victim's credibility.' 51 The
South Dakota Supreme Court differed from its Louisiana
counterpart, however, in holding that CSAAS was scientific
evidence that was evaluated and found admissible under the
Daubert standard.152
Kentucky has taken a very conservative course with regard
to CSAAS evidence, disallowing its admission for any purpose,
including rebuttal and rehabilitation of the victim-witness. 153
A majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected CSAAS
evidence on the grounds that it "lacked relevancy and invaded
the province of the jury by expressing an opinion on the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence." 154 Although the court
declined to decide whether CSAAS satisfied the Daubert
standard for admissibility, 155 the opinion's language makes
such acceptance unlikely.156 The court found that the experts
who testified were able to establish neither that CSAAS was
"subject to testing for falsifiability or refutability" nor that it
147. Id. at 1130.
148. See State v. Ste. Marie, 801 So. 2d 424, 427-31 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1127-31).
149. Id. at 429-31.
150. State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, 422-24 (S.D. 1999).
151. Id. at 423-24.
152. Id. at 422-23.
153. See Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 695-96 (Ky. 1996).
The court "recognize[d] that some will regard this opinion as regressive and
unenlightened." Id. at 695. Indeed, some of the court's own members
appeared to hold this view. See id. at 696 (Graves, J., dissenting).
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had a knowable or acceptable error rate, two "primary criteria"
in the Daubert test.' 57 The court concluded that "the evidence
in question appears to fall short of the Daubert standard for
admissibility."15 8
Thus of the three Daubert states meeting this Note's
criteria, one (Louisiana) considers CSAAS evidence to be
opinion rather than scientific, one (South Dakota) admits
CSAAS only for rebuttal purpose to rehabilitate the victim-
witness, and one (Kentucky) excludes CSAAS for any
purpose. 159 A similar range of opinions with regard to CSAAS
is also found in states that follow the Frye standard, as
described in the following section.
B. FRYE STATES DIFFER WITH REGARD TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
REBUTTAL CSAAS EVIDENCE
The Michigan Supreme Court found that Frye was not
applicable to CSAAS, 160 because such "[s]yndrome evidence is
157. Id.
158. Id. In Newkirk the trial court conducted a Daubert hearing, after
which it admitted the State's CSAAS evidence, which was offered to rebut
recantation of the victim's allegations. Id. at 699-700 (Willett, J., dissenting).
The supreme court was no more convinced of the admissibility of CSAAS
under the Daubert standard followed in Newkirk than it had been under the
Frye standard followed in several previous cases. See, e.g., Hellstrom v.
Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613-14 (Ky. 1992) (refusing to admit CSAAS
testimony by a social worker because the testimony was not probative of
whether sexual abuse occurred, the testimony invaded the province of the jury
in determining witness credibility, and the social worker was not qualified to
render an opinion whether the child was suffering from CSAAS); Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Ky. 1989) (refusing to admit CSAAS
testimony because no medical testimony established CSAAS was a generally
accepted medical concept and the CSAAS "testimony had no substantial
relevance to the issue of ... guilt or innocence"); Lantrip v. Commonwealth,
713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky. 1986) (refusing to admit CSAAS testimony because
no evidence showed it had yet "attained a scientific acceptance or credibility
among clinical psychologists or psychiatrists"); Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697
S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Ky. 1985) (refusing to admit CSAAS testimony because no
evidence showed that CSAAS was a "generally accepted medical concept" and
the evidence was immaterial because the syndrome could have resulted from
"sexual abuse inflected upon [the child] by persons other than [the
defendant]"). Kentucky acknowledged the Daubert standard in Cecil v.
Commonwealth. 888 S.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Ky. 1995); see Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d
at 695.
159. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 693-96; State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116,
1125-28 (La. 1993); State v. Ste. Marie, 801 So. 2d 424, 427-31 (La. Ct. App.
2001); State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, 422-24 (S.D. 1999).
160. People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 866 (Mich. 1995) (citing People v.
Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990)). The Beckley court found that "it
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not a technique or principle that can predict abuse, but merely
an expert's opinion that explains and describes probable
responses to a traumatic event." 161 In holding CSAAS to be
merely an expert's opinion, not subject to prevailing standards
of admissibility for scientific evidence, Michigan followed the
path of Louisiana, a Daubert state.162 However, whereas
Louisiana admitted CSAAS evidence only to rehabilitate the
victim-witness, 163 the Michigan Supreme Court admitted
CSAAS not only for rehabilitation, but also in the prosecution's
case-in-chief to explain common but easily misunderstood
characteristics of sexually abused children. 164 The evidence
was not admissible to prove that abuse actually occurred, nor
could the expert give any opinion as to the victim's credibility
or the defendant's guilt. 165
In Mississippi, the supreme court upheld a trial court's
admission of testimony from the victim's physician, who
provided evidence of not only physical but also behavioral
characteristics suggestive of sexual abuse. 166 The court did not
label the testimony as CSAAS, apparently adhering to its
earlier holding that "while testimony as to CSAAS is improper,
is difficult to fit the behavioral professions within the application and
definition of Davis/Frye." 456 N.W.2d at 404.
161. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 864 (paraphrasing Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at
410).
Arizona followed a path similar to Michigan. See State v. Curry, 931 P.2d
1133, 1138-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). The Curry court held that an expert could
testify as to behavioral characteristics that are common in sexually abused
children without the need for a Frye hearing, because such testimony was not
.new, novel or experimental scientific evidence." Id. at 1139 (quoting State v.
Varela, 873 P.2d 657, 663-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)). Unfortunately, the
opinion did not make clear if a Frye hearing was not required because CSAAS
was not "new, novel or experimental" or, alternatively, because it was not
"scientific." Id.; see also Varela, 873 P.2d at 663-63. In spite of its decision
that a Frye test was not required, the Curry court commented in a footnote
that "[tihe Frye test appears to have been satisfied." Id. at 1139 n.1.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49.
163. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 864.
164. Id. at 868-69.
165. Id. at 866.
166. State v. Crawford, 754 So. 2d 1211, 1217-18 (Miss. 2000). Although
Mississippi follows the Frye standard, as recently affirmed in Gleeton v. State,
716 So. 2d 1083, 1086-87 (Miss. 1998), it is not clear from the record if the trial
judge in Crawford applied Daubert or Frye in admitting the physician's
testimony. 754 So. 2d at 1216. The supreme court held that the "testimony
would pass muster under either Daubert or Frye" and that "[u]nder Frye, [the




testimony by an expert as to certain behavior common to
sexually abused children is proper."167 In spite (or perhaps
because) of the lack of label, the Mississippi rulings were broad
in that they allowed an expert to state whether the victim's
behavior shares characteristics with that of a sexually abused
child and even to give an opinion as to whether the child has
been sexually abused. 168
Florida has similarly tried to make a distinction between
"syndrome" evidence and opinion evidence in cases of child
sexual abuse, such as presented in Hadden v. State.
169
Specifically, the court held that "[w]e differentiate pure opinion
testimony based upon clinical experience from profile and
syndrome evidence because profile and syndrome evidence rely
on conclusions based upon studies and tests."170 According to
the court, testimony regarding CSAAS was considered
syndrome evidence and was not admissible under Frye.171 In
contrast, "pure opinion testimony" which is "personally
developed" and "based solely on the expert's training and
[clinical] experience" did not have to pass the Frye test and
could be admitted if consistent with the rules of evidence. 17 2
Such a distinction would seem difficult and counterproductive
to put into practice, particularly in areas of expertise
encompassing psychology, psychiatry, and human behavior. 173
167. Hall v. State, 611 So. 2d 915, 919 (Miss. 1992) (relying on John E.B.
Myers, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1,
51, 62-65, 69 (1989)). The court in Hall distinguished testimony regarding a
"syndrome" from testimony that simply describes behaviors commonly
observed in sexually abused children. Id. at 918-19. The concern seemed to be
that use of the word "syndrome" could create in the minds of the jurors the
impression that behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children conform
to a medical diagnosis, a proposition that is not widely held in the medical
community. See id.; Myers, supra, at 69. In Hall, there is no mention of Frye
or Daubert; rather, the court relied on Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, which
is comparable to its federal counterpart. Hall, 611 So. 2d at 920.
168. See Crawford, 754 So. 2d at 1217; Hall, 611 So. 2d at 919.
169. 690 So. 2d 573, 580 (Fla. 1997).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 578-79. In Hadden, CSAAS had been offered "to prove the
alleged victim of sexual abuse exhibits symptoms consistent with one who has
been sexually abused." Id. at 575.
172. Id. at 579-80.
173. In Hadden, the court excluded testimony from a mental health
counselor who testified that "based on his experience and training in child sex-
abuse cases, the victim exhibited symptoms consistent with a child who had
been sexually abused." Id. at 575, 580. The court excluded his testimony
because it was "based not only upon [his] experiences" but also upon his
knowledge of syndromes and other diagnostic criteria and standards, which
20031 1609
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A more recent appellate court opinion suggests that the
effect of Hadden will be the general exclusion of evidence
concerning behaviors of sexually abused children. 174 In Irving
v. State a Florida appellate court excluded testimony of a
clinical psychologist who testified, based upon his experience
and training, that the victim exhibited characteristics of a child
who had been abused. 175 Although the psychologist never used
the word "syndrome" or "profile", the court believed that "his
testimony may have been based upon CSAAS evidence, which
was specifically found to be inadmissible in Hadden."176 Thus,
while Florida, like Mississippi, has tried to distinguish CSAAS
or syndrome evidence from pure opinion evidence, the practical
effects of the distinction in the two Frye states are different:
Florida has a restrictive policy of admission, while Mississippi
has a broad policy of admission. Thus, the Frye states exhibit
the same wide range of opinions with regard to CSAAS
admissibility as do the Daubert states.
must pass the Frye test. Id. at 580-81. Brought to its logical outcome, this
rationale would likely result in the preferential exclusion of scholarly experts
who incorporate the studies and the writings of other experts into their own
practice and their own observations of human behavior. Such a development,
far from aiding the judicial fact-finding process, seems more likely to inhibit it.
174. See Irving v. State, 705 So. 2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1023 (emphasis added).
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Table 1: State Decisions on Three Types of Scientific Evidence
Ruling
Admit Exclude Undecided Opinion*
PCR-STR DNA
Profiling
Frye 70 0 0 0
Daubert 2 b 0 0 0
HGN
Frye 9C 4d  0 0
Daubert 1 e f 2 g 0
CSAAS
Frye 1 h i i 0 1j
Daubert 1 k 1' 0 1m
* The court ruled that the evidence in question was not
"scientific" but rather "opinion" evidence.
a California, Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York
b Connecticut, Massachusetts
C Alaska, California, Florida, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Washington
d Kansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
e South Dakota
f New Mexico









VI. PATTERNS IN THE FRYE VERSUS
DAUBERT COMPARISON
The results of this survey (summarized in Table 1) do not
support the idea that Frye and Daubert admissibility standards
lead to distinct practical outcomes, nor the view that the Frye
standard in practice is more stringent than Daubert.77 The
survey is far from exhaustive, being limited to only three types
of scientific testimony and to states that followed Frye in 1993
and then either switched to Daubert or continued to follow
Frye. Nonetheless, some patterns emerge.
A review of the results shows no correlation between
application of one or the other standard and admissibility of
any of the three types of scientific evidence examined (Table 1).
Whether following Frye or Daubert standards, nearly all states
admitted PCR-STR DNA evidence (Table 1). There was less
consistency with regard to HGN and CSAAS evidence, but
admission or exclusion did not appear to depend on the
admissibility standard to which the courts adhered (Table 1).
No comparison here presented suggests that Frye states were
less likely to admit any of the types of evidence examined.
Indeed the relatively large number of Frye states admitting
PCR-STR DNA evidence and HGN evidence tends to belie this
view (Table 1). Based solely on the opinions discussed in Parts
III-V of this Note, several common factors emerge that may
contribute to the patterns of admissibility discerned. These
factors are discussed in the following section.
A. TYPES OF SUPPORTING/REFUTING EVIDENCE
Most courts readily accepted PCR-STR DNA evidence, in
spite of the fact that the laboratory procedures involved were
different in several ways from the original DNA tests used in
judicial proceedings. 178 A number of common arguments in
177. See, e.g., State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) ("It is not lost
upon us that this new [Daubert] standard serves to remove some of the
barriers in the admission of expert testimony in many fields, including child
sexual abuse cases."); M.H. Graham, supra note 2, at 4 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court attempted to liberalize admissibility standards in Daubert, but
that in practice liberalization has not occurred); Barry C. Scheck, DNA and
Daubert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 1996-97 (1994) (suggesting that "courts
seem to assume that Daubert must always be a more liberal standard of
admissibility than Frye"); cf. Montz, supra note 2, at 89 (suggesting that "the
dilemma is that Daubert is both more and less restrictive of expert
testimony").
178. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1, III.
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support of admissibility run through the opinions concerning
PCR-STR DNA evidence. Several courts mentioned favorably
the NRC DNA Report, 179 the guidelines from the Technical
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM), i80 the
large number of peer-reviewed publications concerning PCR-
STR DNA techniques from scientific and forensic
laboratories,' 8 1 and/or the fact that PCR-STR DNA techniques
were relied upon for identification of deceased soldiers in
Operation Desert Storm and victims of the World Trade Center
attacks. 8 2 Furthermore, several opinions indicated that the
defense offered no specific testimony or writings to support its
motion to exclude PCR-STR DNA evidence.1 83 In one case, the
defense expert essentially admitted that PCR-STR DNA
methodologies were generally accepted. 184  Most decisions
rendered after 2000 also considered significant the widespread
acceptance of PCR-STR evidence in other jurisdictions.18 5
Uncontroverted (or poorly controverted) evidence from
independent, nationwide, scientific, and forensic sources,
combined with widespread judicial approval, is, not
surprisingly, likely to transcend differences in evidentiary
admissibility standard.
HGN and CSAAS do not enjoy the same widespread
scientific and forensic support as PCR-STR DNA
methodologies, and this may be reflected in the split in judicial
opinions regarding HGN and CSAAS, both in Frye and Daubert
states. Particularly in more controversial fields of study, the
possibility exists that ultimate acceptance or exclusion of an
evidentiary offering may depend upon the skill and oral acuity
of the particular expert witnesses called to testify. With regard
179. State v. Grant, No. CR6481390, 2002 WL 853627, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. April 9, 2002); Lemour v. State, 802 So. 2d 402, 405-06 & n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Mass. 1997).
180. People v. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 118-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);
State v. Deloatch, 804 A.2d 604, 610-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002).
181. Grant, 2002 WL 853627, at *4; Lemour, 802 So.2d at 405-06; Deloatch,
804 A.2d at 610.
182. People v. Allen, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Grant,
2002 WL 853627, at *7; Rosier, 685 N.E.2d at 743.
183. Grant, 2002 WL 853627, at *1; Rosier, 685 N.E.2d at 743; State v.
Jackson, 582 N.W.2d 317, 324-26 (Neb. 1998); Deloatch, 804 A.2d at 611.
184. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116-17.
185. Id. at 117 (citing other California decisions that had admitted PCR-
STR DNA evidence); Grant, 2002 WL 853627, at *6; Lemour, 802 So. 2d at




to HGN evidence, the same expert, Dr. Marcelline Burns, has
testified in hearings or trials in more than half the states. 186 At
least in the states included in this Note, her testimony most
often preceded a favorable ruling with regard to HGN
admissibility, 8 7 but not always. Kansas and New Mexico
courts, which follow Frye and Daubert standards respectively,
excluded HGN evidence in spite of her testimony at trial. 188
Thus at least with regard to HGN, courts in both Frye and
Daubert states arrived at opposite conclusions after hearing
testimony by the same strong proponent.
B. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND OPINION TESTIMONY
The line between scientific and opinion testimony can be
difficult to draw, but the distinction is an important one, since
the former must pass the prevailing admissibility test, be it
Frye or Daubert, while the latter has no such constraints. 8 9
When evidence is based on the "hard" sciences, such as DNA
testing, the applicability of Frye or Daubert is usually clear. 90
In contrast, a bright line between science and opinion is harder
to draw in testimony concerning psychological syndromes or
patterns of behavior.' 9' Within the criteria of this Note, the
courts in one out of three Daubert states and one out of three
186. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 552-53 (D. Md.
2002) (citing cases in which testimony of Dr. Burns figured prominently in the
court's conclusion that HGN tests were admissible); State v. Baue, 607 N.W.2d
191, 201-02 (Neb. 2000) (stating that Dr. Burns had previously testified in
approximately 26 jurisdictions); State v. Lasworth, 42 P.3d 844, 847 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2001). Dr. Burns is a research psychologist and strong proponent of
HGN who has participated in field sobriety tests for the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration. See, e.g., Baue, 607 N.W.2d at 201-02;
Lasworth, 42 P.3d at 847.
187. Ballard v. State, 955 P.2d 931, 934-36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); People
v. Joehnk, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Williams v. State, 710 So.
2d 24, 31-32 n.12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d
577, 581-812 (Minn. 1994); State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993), overruled on other grounds en banc by State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 578
(Mo. 1997); Baue, 607 N.W.2d at 201-03; State v. Baity, 901 P.2d 1151, 1158 &
n.10 (Wash. 2000).
188. State v. Chastain, 960 P.2d 756, 761 (Kan. 1998); Lasworth, 42 P.3d at
846-50.
189. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 147-49, 160-62.
190. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 29, at 21 n.2, 29-30; supra notes 29, 58
and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., McCord, supra note 29, at 21 n.2, 29-30; supra notes 29, 31,
58 and accompanying text.
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Frye states considered CSAAS opinion evidence. 192 While the
courts' attempts to distinguish between opinion and scientific
evidence in the field of human behavior can be difficult to
decipher, they were not related to Frye and Daubert inquiries,
at least with regard to CSAAS admissibility. 193
C. JUDICIAL NOTICE
The philosophy of a court toward judicial notice is a factor
that may play a role in decisions to admit or exclude evidence,
independent of the admissibility standard to which the court
adheres. The Minnesota Supreme Court, which follows Frye,
declined to take judicial notice of PCR-STR DNA methodology
as late as 2002,194 in spite of the fact that virtually all
jurisdictions that have confronted this type of evidence have
ruled favorably on its admissibility, 195 as have four district
courts in Minnesota. 196  In contrast to the conservative
approach in Minnesota, another Frye state, Maryland, took
judicial notice of HGN, a more controversial type of evidence
than PCR-STR DNA, in 1995.197
Michigan and Florida, which like Maryland adhere to the
Frye standard, followed Maryland's lead in taking judicial
notice of HGN in 1996 and 1998 respectively. 98 In contrast to
these three Frye states that took judicial notice of HGN
between 1995 and 1998, at least one Frye state, New Jersey,
and two Daubert states, Connecticut and New Mexico, declined
to take judicial notice of this technique in 2000, 2002, and 1999,
respectively. 199 The New Jersey court believed that the HGN
"decisions and studies are by no means unchallenged, for there
appears to exist substantial opposing authority."200 Similarly,
192. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49, 160-65.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49, 160-65; see also supra text
accompanying notes 169-76.
194. State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819-22 (Minn. 2002).
195. See, e.g., State v. Deloatch, 804 A.2d 604, 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2002).
196. Roman Nose, 640 N.W.2d at 825, 827 (Gilbert, J., dissenting)
197. Schultz v. State, 664 A.2d 60, 69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
198. Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); People
v. Berger, 551 N.W.2d 421, 424 & n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
199. State v. PJura, 789 A.2d 1124, 1133 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); State v.
Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000); State v. Torres, 976 P.2d
20, 33 (N.M. 1999).
200. State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 345 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000) (quoting
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 334-35 (Cal. 1994) (en banc)).
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the New Mexico court found "no clear guidance from other
jurisdictions with regard to ... their specific treatment of HGN
evidence"20 1 and was "not persuaded that HGN testing is 'a
subject of common and general knowledge,' or a matter 'well
established and authoritatively settled.' 20 2
These comparisons support at least two observations.
First, a court's philosophy toward judicial notice is a factor that
may enter into an admissibility decision, independent of Frye or
Daubert criteria. Second, the "flexible" nature of the Daubert
standard20 3 does not necessarily correlate with a more flexible
philosophy of judicial notice of scientific methods.
D. INTERPRETATION OF THE FRYE AND DAUBERT STANDARDS
When applying either the Frye or Daubert standards,
courts have considerable flexibility with regard to the exact
nature of the inquiry. The Frye standard of "general
acceptance in the particular field in which [the scientific
principle or discovery] belongs"204 is broad, as the court
provided no guidance in how to assess acceptance. Similarly,
the Daubert court's focus on "scientific validity [ I and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability" of the scientific principles
was not accompanied by a "definitive checklist or test" but only
by "some general observations" for judges charged with
rendering admissibility decisions. 20 5  Thus, perhaps not
surprisingly, different courts emphasize different aspects and
interpretations of the standards when evaluating admissibility
of an offered scientific methodology.
The Connecticut and Massachusetts supreme courts have
suggested that, even under the Daubert standard that they
both follow, the general acceptance inquiry of Frye may be
considered determinative. 206 Their philosophy is that, if a
scientific technique has achieved general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community, no further inquiry under the
Daubert standard is necessary.20 7
While other Daubert courts may not be so direct about
201. Torres, 976 P.2d at 27.
202. Id. at 33 (quoting Rozelle v. Barnard, 382 P.2d 180, 181 (N.M. 1963)).
203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
204. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
205. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95.




their espousal of this philosophy, some of them appear to give
great weight to the general acceptance standard of Frye. For
example, the South Dakota Supreme Court, in deciding that
HGN evidence was admissible, listed numerous other
jurisdictions that had "found that use of HGN testing has
gained acceptance in the general scientific community and
satisfies both the Frye and Daubert tests for admission of
scientific evidence."208 Other than mentioning the general
acceptance of HGN, the South Dakota court did not describe
how this type of evidence fits any of the suggested Daubert
criteria. Similarly, when the South Dakota Supreme Court
admitted CSAAS evidence, it did not provide details of how this
evidence satisfied the suggested Daubert factors. 209
In contrast to the admission of HGN and CSAAS in South
Dakota, other Daubert states have excluded the same evidence
under Daubert. In excluding HGN, New Mexico claimed that it
needed more biological, physical, or medical evidence
concerning the physiological mechanisms that cause HGN, as
its role was to "conduct a searching, de novo inquiry into the
validity of... HGN... not to merely rubber stamp the
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions that have admitted
such evidence."210 These comments suggest that the New
Mexico court was seeking an explanation of the physiological
basis of the test, not simply whether it was a reliable indication
of intoxication.211 The Kentucky Supreme Court, in excluding
CSAAS evidence, found that it was not generally accepted in
the scientific community.2 12 The court also found that CSAAS
was not likely to satisfy two other Daubert criteria, first
whether it was subject to testing for refutability and second
whether it had a known error rate.213 Thus Kentucky, in
excluding CSAAS, was much more specific in its application of
Daubert factors than South Dakota, which admitted the
evidence. 214 These few examples reinforce the observation that
there is a wide range of interpretations and applications of
Daubert in the state courts.
There is a similarly wide diversity in application of Frye's
208. State v. Hullinger, 649 N.W.2d 253, 258 (S.D. 2002) (emphasis added).
209. State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, 422-23 (S.D. 1999).
210. State v. Lasworth, 42 P.3d 844, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
211. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
212. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996).
213. Id. at 695.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
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general acceptance standard. In State v. Doriguzzi, the New
Jersey appellate court declined to admit HGN evidence. 215
Since the Doriguzzi court ruled in 2000, it had the benefit of
opinions from many other Frye jurisdictions that had
previously considered HGN evidence, all using the general
acceptance standard.216 The New Jersey court made clear in its
Doriguzzi opinion that it gave great weight to opinions
excluding HGN written by the Kansas Supreme Court in 1992
and 1998.217 In contrast, the Doriguzzi court gave little
attention to opinions from other Frye states (California,
Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, and Missouri) that
had admitted HGN evidence between 1993 and 1998.218 In
addition, the Doriguzzi court cited favorably a 1994
Washington appellate court decision that declined to take
judicial notice of HGN, but it failed to mention a subsequent
Washington Supreme Court opinion that held HGN admissible
under Frye.219 Thus, the New Jersey court was highly selective
in the Frye opinions that it chose to emphasize. The court
explained that
[gleneral acceptance within the relevant scientific community consists
215. See State v. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000).
216. See id. at 340-41.
217. See id. at 346 (quoting State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1121 (Kan.
1992)); id. at 345 (citing State v. Chastain, 960 P.2d 756 (Kan. 1998), for the
proposition that HGN has still not achieved sufficient general acceptance to
allow the Kansas Supreme Court to take judicial notice of this technique).
218. See id. at 340-45 (citing Schultz v. State, 664 A.2d 60 (Md. 1995), and
People v. Berger, 551 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. 1996), in a list of states that have
admitted HGN evidence without further comment). The Doriguzzi court cited
a 1996 Florida opinion (among others) for the proposition that HGN admission
requires a Frye analysis. Id. at 340 (citing State v. Meador, 674 So. 2d 826
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)). The Doriguzzi court did not, however, cite a later
opinion from the same appellate level Florida court that held that HGN was so
well accepted that there was no need to apply Frye. See Williams v. State, 710
So. 2d 24, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); supra note 128. The Doriguzzi court
did not cite several other opinions favorable to HGN admission: People v.
Joehnk, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Klawitter, 518
N.W.2d 577, 585 (Minn. 1994); State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993), overruled on other grounds en banc by State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518,
520 (Mo. 1997).
219. See Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d at 345-46 (citing favorably State v. Cissne,
865 P.2d 564, 568-69 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) for its decision not to take judicial
notice of HGN testing). The Doriguzzi court fails to mention State v. Baity,
991 P.2d 1151, 1158-59 (Wash. 2000), which held that HGN is admissible
under the Frye standard as evidence of drug intoxication, at least when the
test is administered as part of a drug recognition protocol. See supra note 117.
The Washington Supreme Court opinion was filed on February 3, 2000, seven
months before the Doriguzzi case was argued.
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of more than just counting up how many cases go in a certain
direction. General acceptance is not an end in itself. It is the test
used to ascertain whether a sufficient level of reliability has been
achieved.220
This explanation does not clarify why the opinions
excluding HGN evidence were more compelling to the New
Jersey court than those admitting it, unless the court was
looking for near unanimity in endorsement of the test. Other
courts have explained that, while the Frye standard requires
general acceptance, it does not mandate universal
acceptance. 221  Thus, different Frye courts have different
interpretations of the general acceptance standard that they
follow. Given the wide interpretations possible for both Frye
and Daubert standards, the observation in this Note that there
is no correlation between admissibility and adherence to one or
the other standard should not be surprising.222
CONCLUSION
The Daubert standard, promulgated nearly a decade ago,
envisioned a more flexible approach to admissibility of scientific
evidence, consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence. This
Note has examined the results of admissibility challenges for
three scientific methodologies in Frye and Daubert states to
ascertain whether there is a practical difference in the way that
jurisdictions adhering to the two standards rule on scientific
evidence. Although states vary widely in how they treat
certain types of scientific evidence, this variation does not
correlate with the adherence to Frye or Daubert admissibility
standards. The inherent (and perhaps unavoidable) breadth of
the inquiries compatible with either standard permits widely
variable opinions concerning admissibility of a single scientific
methodology. The striking differences among states with
respect to admissibility of scientific evidence are not likely to be
lessened by uniform adoption of either the Frye or Daubert
standard.
220. Dorizuggi, 760 A.2d at 347.
221. See Williams v. State, 710 So. 2d 24, 35 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998).
222. See supra Table 1.
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